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An Unconstitutional Response to 
Citizens United 
MANDATING SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF 
CORPORATE POLITICAL EXPENDITURES 
In accepting corporate money, I promise to respect federal election 
laws the same way I respect the must-shower-before-swimming law 
at the Y. As a candidate, I am under no obligation to promote the 
zesty, robust taste of Doritos brand tortilla chips regardless of how 
great a snack they may be for lunchtime, munch time, anytime. 
–Stephen Colbert1 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Colbert, the host of a satirical political news show, 
The Colbert Report,2 took some significant steps toward 
running for President of the United States in the 2008 election.3 
Although Mr. Colbert’s candidacy was sardonic in nature, the 
real steps he took toward procuring a spot on the ballot in 
South Carolina brought the potential of sanction by the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC).4 Doritos, manufactured by 
PepsiCo, Inc. (PepsiCo), sponsored Mr. Colbert on Comedy 
Central at the time he launched his purported candidacy in 
2007.5 A former FEC general counsel stated that PepsiCo’s 
sponsorship of Mr. Colbert’s show, and ostensibly of his 
  
 1 Rick Klein, No Joke: Colbert’s Campaign May Run Afoul of Law, ABC 
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=3766656. 
 2 Clifford A. Jones, The Stephen Colbert Problem: The Media Exemption for 
Corporate Political Advocacy and the “Hail to the Cheese Stephen Colbert Nacho Cheese 
Doritos® 2008 Presidential Campaign Coverage,” 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 296 
n.2 (2008). 
 3 Jacques Steinberg, Colbert Consulted Parties Before Announcing Run, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at E2. 
 4 Klein, supra note 1. 
 5 Jones, supra note 2, at 299. Professor Jones notes that “[t]here was apparently 
no actual sponsorship and Pepsi[C]o, maker of Nacho Cheese Doritos, paid no consideration 
for being featured in the ‘campaign.’” Id. at 299 n.17 (citing Richard L. Hasen, Stephen 
Colbert’s “Hail to the Cheese” Presidential Candidacy: Why the Comedian’s Campaign Raises 
Serious Questions About the Role of Corporate Money in Elections, FINDLAW.COM (Nov. 9, 
2007), http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/commentary/20071109_hasen.html). 
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candidacy, raised “serious questions.”6 One question was 
whether PepsiCo’s sponsorship violated federal campaign-
finance laws that—at the time—barred corporations from 
directly contributing to candidates or making independent 
political expenditures from their corporate treasuries.7 Just a 
few years later, the legal landscape regulating corporate 
political activity has changed drastically. 
When the Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. FEC8 
on January 21, 2010, it caused a major shift in campaign-finance 
law.9 In that seminal decision, the Court held a ban on independent 
corporate political expenditures10 to be unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment.11 Specifically, the Court held that Congress may 
not ban political speech on the basis of “the corporate identity of the 
speaker and the content of the political speech.”12 As a result of the 
five-to-four decision, corporations may now legally use their general 
treasuries to fund political advertising or make other independent 
political expenditures.13  
Within this new paradigm, PepsiCo could seemingly pay 
for an advertisement that featured Mr. Colbert’s candidacy 
  
 6 Klein, supra note 1 (quoting Lawrence M. Noble, counsel at Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP); see also Jones, supra note 2, at 307-09. 
 7 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006). 
 8 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). This note takes no position as to the wisdom of the 
majority opinion in Citizens United. Rather, the focus of this note is to evaluate 
legislative proposals in light of the decision. 
 9 See Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 243 (2010) 
(“Citizens United . . . represents the Roberts Court’s clear reversal of [the trend of 
expansion of campaign finance regulation] and a narrow focus on quid pro quo 
corruption as the exclusive grounds for government regulation.”); Molly J. Walker 
Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2365, 2392 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the Citizens United decision does 
more than to give corporate interests a place at the table. It gives them a place at the 
head of the table and a bullhorn.”); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate 
Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1 (Citizens United was a “sharp 
doctrinal shift”). Although Citizens United essentially extended the same theoretical 
framework announced in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007), the 
practical implications of the Citizens United decision were extremely broad. 
 10 2 U.S.C. § 441b; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Section 441b makes it a 
felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications 
within [thirty] days of a primary election and [sixty] days of a general election.”).  
 11 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.  
 12 Id. at 913; see also Jeremy R. Peterman, Note, PACs Post-Citizens United: 
Improving Accountability and Equality in Campaign Finance, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160, 
1179-80 (2011). 
 13 WHITAKER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41096, LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS 
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 1-2 (2010), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41096.pdf; R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41054, CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. 
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1-2 (2010), 
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41054_20100201.pdf. 
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(should he run in 2012) and perhaps also feature Doritos-brand 
tortilla chips, so long as PepsiCo made the expenditure 
independently and not in coordination with Mr. Colbert.14 If 
PepsiCo were to fund such an advertisement, its shareholders 
could take issue with corporate spending on advertising that 
featured Mr. Colbert’s candidacy.15 Surely, some shareholders 
would not want PepsiCo to wade into politics and others might 
oppose Mr. Colbert’s candidacy, whether satirical or not. In Citizens 
United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, addressed the 
interests of shareholders by stating that “the procedures of 
corporate democracy”16 could deal with such concerns.  
  
 14 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has suggested that the Supreme Court will go 
even further in extending political speech rights to corporations in the near future and 
“hold that corporations have the right to contribute money to candidates for elective 
office . . . .” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of the First Amendment, 46 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 623, 638 (2010). If Dean Chemerinsky’s prediction comes true, then the direct 
corporate sponsorship of a political campaign would have constitutional protection. In a 
recent decision, a district court held the ban on companies’ direct contributions to federal 
candidates to be unconstitutional. United States v. Danielczyk, No. 1:11cr85 (JCC), 2011 
WL 2161794, at *19 (E.D. Va. May 26, 2011) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)); see also 
Nathan Koppel, Judge Rules Ban on Corporate Campaign Contributions 
Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (May 27, 2011, 2:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
law/2011/05/27/judge-rules-ban-on-corporate-campaign-contributions-unconstitutional/. 
However, Professor Hasen has written that he expects the Danielczyk decision to be 
reversed on appeal. Rick Hasen, Federal District Court, in Criminal Case, Holds that 
Ban on Direct Corporate Contributions to Candidates Is Unconstitutional Under 
Citizens United, ELECTION L. BLOG (May 26, 2011, 9:58 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/ 
?p=18342.  
 15 See Justin J. Wert, Ronald Keither Gaddie & Charles S. Bullock, III, Of 
Benedick and Beatrice: Citizens United and the Reign of the Laggard Court, 20 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719, 726-27 (2011) (“Taking controversial and highly visible 
political stands can potentially cost clients and therefore lead to financial costs. 
Corporate stocks and corporate products have been punished by consumers for overt 
political activity . . . . A rise in overt, direct political action by most corporations carries 
with it risks far exceeding the political gains that might be achieved by acting through 
other agents.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and 
Corporate Political Speech: Did the Supreme Court Enhance Political Discourse or 
Invite Corruption?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 29, 95-96 (2010) (“[C]orporations are 
constrained by the potential reaction of customers, employees, shareholders, public 
interest groups, and non-governmental organizations to open advocacy. Unseemly 
corporate campaigning may result in loss of customers, employee dissatisfaction, or 
shareholder agitation in the form of proxy fights.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 16 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)). But see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaigning, 
FORBES.COM (Jan. 29, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/28/corporate-
campaign-politics-legal-opinions-contributors-ciara-torres-spelliscy.html. This note does 
not challenge the constitutionality of shareholders sua sponte restricting their 
corporation’s spending on political endeavors. However, one commentator has pointed 
out that while “a shareholder could simply dissociate himself from a corporation should 
its expressed political ideals conflict with his own,” the shareholder might already have 
been harmed “by the time a shareholder first learns his political views conflict with 
those disseminated by the corporation.” Alex Osterlind, Note, Giving a Voice to the 
Inanimate: The Right of a Corporation to Political Free Speech, 76 MO. L. REV. 259, 281 
(2011); see also Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder 
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In the wake of the Citizens United decision, academics,17 
think tanks,18 and legislators19 have put forth many proposals in 
an attempt to counteract the increased potential for corporate 
political involvement that has resulted from the Supreme 
Court’s “robust conception of corporate political speech.”20 
Although shareholder-driven governance will certainly be 
permitted to direct corporations in this arena as the 
shareholders see fit, some members of Congress and think 
tanks have proposed to make this voluntary procedure 
mandatory.21 Three prominent proposals would make 
significant changes to the federal securities laws and would 
mandate shareholder approval of a corporation’s political 
expenditures,22 similar to the current campaign-finance law in 
  
Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 58 (2009), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/2009/10/15/pollman.html (concluding that “lack of 
stockholder assent to corporate political speech is more compelling than ever”). 
 17 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Governance After ‘Citizens United,’ 
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 2010, at col. 2. 
 18 See, e.g., Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., Party Provision in “Disclose” 
Bill Is a Plus; It Could Be Made Better (May 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/10-05-04/Party_Provision_In_DISCLOSE_Bill_Is_ 
a_Plus_It_Could_Be_Made_Better.aspx; Press Release, Campaign Legal Ctr., Legal 
Center Offers Possible Legislative Fixes to Citizens United at Request of Senate Committee 
(Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=897:pr3834&catid=63:legal-center-press-releases&Itemid=61; 
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending: Giving Shareholders a Voice, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 27, 2010), http://brennan.3cdn.net/54a676e481f019bfb8_ 
bvm6ivakn.pdf [hereinafter Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending]. 
 19 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 13, at 2-7; Jonathan Alter, High-Court 
Hypocrisy, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 1585183; Democrats 
Move to Blunt Citizens United Ruling, POLITICO (Apr. 24, 2010, 11:47 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/36303.html; David D. Kirkpatrick, Democrats 
Try to Rebuild Campaign-Spending Barriers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/us/politics/12citizens.html?_r=1. 
 20 Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings 
in the Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17, 17 (May 15, 2010), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/election-law/addressing-
political-captive-audience-workplace-meetings-in-the-post%11citizens-united-environment/. 
Professor Hasen has referred to the Court’s approach as “a kind of First Amendment 
absolutism . . . .” Richard L. Hasen, Un-American Influence: Could Foreign Spending on 
Elections Really Be Illegal?, SLATE (Oct. 11, 2010, 1:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2270662/. For a list of proposals related to Citizens United, see Comment, Citizens 
United v. FEC: Corporate Political Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 75, 81 n.62 (2010). 
 21 Some commentators have argued that the fears that these proposals seek 
to address are “overblown, or at the very least misstated” because, in part, “the 
corporate . . . moneys that are opened up for use by the Citizens United decision do not 
exist in a vacuum, sitting in a massive Scrooge McDuck money vault. These moneys, 
whether from profits or member dues, also have other obligations . . . . Political 
activities must be balanced against a variety of other needs and priorities for 
institutional money.” Wert et al., supra note 15, at 722-23. 
 22 See infra Part III. 
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the United Kingdom.23 For example, the Brennan Center for 
Justice urges Congress to amend the federal securities laws by 
“mandating that corporations obtain the consent of 
shareholders before making political expenditures.”24  
Lively and divisive political debate has long centered on 
the interpretation of the First Amendment in the context of 
political campaign finance. Because the outcome of this debate 
will have an unquantifiable impact on the future elections of 
our national leaders—and will dictate upon whom those 
leaders may rely for financial support—many factions pull in 
different directions in an attempt to shape the ongoing 
interpretation of the First Amendment in the corporate-
political-speech context.25 The proponents of the proposals that 
mandate shareholder approval of political expenditures urge an 
unrealistically narrow interpretation of Citizens United. 
Although their authors have noble goals, the proposals are 
unconstitutional under Citizens United and other First 
Amendment jurisprudence.26  
  
 23 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 16; 
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the 
U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (Abolhassan Jalilvand & Tassos Malliaris eds.) (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 49-53), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474421 [hereinafter 
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending]. For an in-depth discussion of the 
British approach to political advertising, see Alexander Boer, Note, Continental Drift: 
Contextualizing Citizens United by Comparing the Diverging British and American 
Approaches to Political Advertising, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 97-99 (2011).  
 24 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 21; see 
also Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, (manuscript at 59). 
For a similar proposal, see Ronald Gilson & Michael Klausner, Corporations Can Now 
Fund Politicians. What Should Investors Do?, FORBES, Mar. 29, 2010, available at 2010 
WLNR 5423725 (“The answer is to mandate that corporations let stockholders vote 
annually on whether they want the company to exercise the rights that Citizens United 
gave them to get into political races. Managers who seek stockholder approval of 
political activity would explain the actions they intend to take, how those actions would 
be in stockholders’ interests and what the cost will be.”).  
 25 Scholars and experts agree that the Citizens United decision has 
significantly impacted the legal and political landscape, but its effects have yet to be 
fully felt or understood. E.g., Christopher Beam, Ad Hominem: How Much Has the 
Citizens United Case Changed Campaign Finance in 2010?, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2010, 6:09 
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2270036/ (“No doubt Citizens United set back the cause of 
campaign finance reform. But the jury is still out on its practical effects.”). 
 26 See WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 8 (“The practicalities of when to require 
[shareholder] votes . . . may need to be carefully considered in order not to run afoul of 
corporate freedom of speech rights defined by the Supreme Court in Citizens United.”). 
The proposals could only be found constitutional if the Supreme Court overruled the 
very case and doctrine that the proposals seek to “remedy.” The proposals, while well-
intentioned and logical, also raise several policy and practical issues that would make 
their implementation difficult or counterproductive. This note will not address these 
issues due to space limitations. 
346 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
Part I of this note provides a brief historical overview of 
campaign-finance law as applied to corporations before Citizens 
United. Part II discusses the Citizens United decision and its 
effects on the legal and political landscape regarding corporate 
contributions and expenditures. Part III provides an outline of 
three proposals that would require mandatory shareholder 
approval of independent political expenditures by corporations. 
Part IV offers a critique of the proposals through an analysis 
under Citizens United and other First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Finally, this note concludes that mandatory shareholder approval 
of political expenditures by corporations is not a constitutional 
response to the potential problems created by Citizens United. 
I. PRE-CITIZENS UNITED LANDSCAPE 
Although Citizens United is undoubtedly the new leading 
case in the area of campaign-finance law,27 several earlier cases 
remain good law and will likely bear upon the Court’s analysis of 
the mandatory shareholder-approval proposals. Since Citizens 
United overruled two cases, proper consideration of the current 
doctrine requires an understanding of the historical doctrine. 
The Supreme Court first recognized the political speech 
rights of corporations in First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti,28 where it struck down a state statute that banned 
corporate political expenditures on referenda unrelated to that 
corporation’s proprietary interests.29 The Court found that, for 
the purposes of independent expenditures on referenda, 
corporations had the same free speech rights as individuals.30 
With regard to analysis in future cases, the Court stated that 
“extending constitutional guarantees to a corporation depends 
upon ‘the nature, history, and purpose of the particular 
constitutional provision.’”31 The Court also noted that free 
  
 27 See Breanne Gilpatrick, Removing Corporate Campaign Finance 
Restrictions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 419 (2011) (“The effect of Citizens United already is 
being felt in federal courtrooms around the country as judges and lawyers come to see 
the decision as a dramatic shift in how the Court views campaign finance laws.”). 
 28 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (“In cases 
where corporate speech has been denied the shelter of the First Amendment, there is 
no suggestion that the reason was because a corporation rather than an individual or 
association was involved.” (citations omitted)). 
 29 Id. at 779, 791-92; see also Matthew Lambert, Beyond Corporate Speech: 
Corporate Powers in a Federalist System, 37 RUTGERS L. REC. 20, 21 (2010). 
 30 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780 & n.15. 
 31 Lambert, supra note 29, at 22 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14). 
Importantly, Citizens United viewed Bellotti as one of the bases for its jurisprudential 
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speech is “indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and 
this is no less true because the speech comes from a 
corporation.”32 
Eight years later, the Supreme Court took a more 
equivocal and complicated approach to corporate political 
expenditures in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 
(MCFL).33 Unlike Bellotti, which involved a for-profit corporation 
that sought to influence votes for a referendum, MCFL resolved 
a First Amendment challenge from a nonprofit corporation that 
sought to influence an election for political office. In MCFL, the 
Court held that the government could not ban ideological 
nonprofits, which do not take corporate or union contributions, 
from spending their treasury funds on explicit political advocacy 
because no risk of dissenting shareholders existed.34 
The next major case to bear upon the issue of the 
political rights of corporations was Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce.35 In Austin, the plaintiffs challenged a 
  
path. For example, the Citizens United Court pointed to Bellotti as reaffirming the 
First Amendment “principle that Government lacks the power to ban corporations from 
speaking.” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010). 
 32 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (footnote omitted). Commentators have also noted 
that “[alt]hough the Court took an expansive view of corporate free speech rights, it 
added an important footnote, footnote 26, stating that ‘Congress might well be able to 
demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent 
expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.’” Richard L. Hasen, 
Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 587-88 (2011); see 
also Wilson, supra note 9, at 2371. 
 33 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 34 Id. at 262-63; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891 (“[T]he Court 
found unconstitutional § 441b’s restrictions on corporate expenditures as applied to 
nonprofit corporations that were formed for the sole purpose of promoting political 
ideas, did not engage in business activities, and did not accept contributions from for-
profit corporations or labor unions.” (citations omitted)); Hasen, supra note 32, at 587-
88; Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and Regulation of the Democratic Process, 18 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 552 (2010); J. Robert Abraham, Note, Saving Buckley: 
Creating a Stable Campaign Finance Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1093 n.105 
(2010); Stephan Stohler, Comment, One Person, One Vote, One Dollar? Campaign 
Finance, Elections, and Elite Democratic Theory, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1257, 1262 n.33 
(2010). The Court also held that a federal prohibition on corporate and union treasury 
spending could only apply to express advocacy. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (“We therefore hold that an expenditure must constitute ‘express 
advocacy’ in order to be subject to the prohibition of § 441b.”). In Citizens United, the 
Court found that the MCFL “exemption” did not apply because “some of the funds 
[Citizens United used] . . . were donations from for-profit corporations.” Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. at 891.  
 35 See generally Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), 
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 
(“Austin is overruled . . . effectively invalidat[ing] not only BCRA Section 203, but also 
2 U.S.C. 441b’s prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for express advocacy” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 
694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that Citizens United overruled Austin). 
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state law that banned corporations from using funds from their 
general treasuries to make independent expenditures on behalf 
of, or in opposition to, state electoral candidates.36 The Austin 
Court upheld the state law on the basis of a fear that 
corporations could distort the political process because “the 
unique state-conferred corporate structure . . . facilitates the 
amassing of large treasuries . . . [that] can unfairly influence 
elections when . . . deployed in the form of independent 
expenditures.”37 After Austin, corporations had no 
constitutional right to make independent campaign 
expenditures out of their general treasuries, but they could still 
expend treasury funds on issue advocacy that mentioned specific 
candidates.38 For example, corporations could not fund 
advertisements that urged citizens to vote for or against a 
candidate in a federal election, but corporations could fund 
advertisements that urged constituents to contact a specific 
legislator regarding a particular cause to express support or 
disapprobation.39 
  
 36 Austin, 494 U.S. at 654. 
 37 Id. at 660. Professor Hasen notes that although the Court explains this 
opinion with “an anti-corruption rationale, Austin’s emphasis on preventing distortion 
of the electoral process through large corporate spending suggested the Court in fact 
was espousing an equality rationale . . . .” Hasen, supra note 32, at 588 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). It has also been noted that with its decision in 
Austin, “the Court moved beyond [a] focus on quid pro quo corruption to embrace 
broader theories” such as “a different type of corruption: ‘the corrosive and distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.’” Abraham, supra note 34, at 1086 (quoting Austin, 494 
U.S. at 659-60); see also Wilson, supra note 9, at 2371-72. 
 38 James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Citizens United v. FEC: “Precisely 
What WRTL Sought to Avoid,” 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 32. 
 39 Excellent examples of these so-called “issue advocacy” advertisements from 
the 1996 presidential campaign abound. Although it is not a corporation, the AFL-CIO 
ran one advertisement titled “No Way” that included this voice-over:  
[Woman]: My husband and I both work. And next year, we’ll have two 
children in college. And it will be very hard to put them through, even with 
the two incomes. 
Announcer: Working families are struggling. But Congressman [X] voted 
with Newt Gingrich to cut college loans, while giving tax breaks to the 
wealthy. He even wants to eliminate the Department of Education. Congress 
will vote again on the budget. Tell Congressman [X], don’t write off our 
children’s future. 
[Woman]: Tell him, his priorities are all wrong. 
DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 11 
(1997), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Political_ 
Communication/Advertising_Research_1997/REP16.PDF. 
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In 2002, Congress reacted to this line of cases in an 
attempt to increase restrictions on both corporate and private 
funding of campaigns and independent political expenditures. 
Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA) and altered the campaign-finance regulatory 
landscape.40 The BCRA, in relevant part, banned the use of 
corporate treasury funds to pay for “electioneering 
communication[s]” during certain preelection time periods, 
such as thirty days before a primary election or sixty days 
before a general election.41 Professor Hasen has explained that 
“[e]lectioneering communications are television or radio (not 
print or Internet) advertisements that feature a candidate for a 
federal election; they are capable of reaching 50,000 people in 
the relevant electorate . . . .”42 In addition, the BCRA preserved 
the ability of corporations to establish political action 
committees (PACs) that could solicit and accept contributions 
from a limited class of individuals, including employees and 
shareholders.43 McConnell v. FEC44 consolidated the multiple 
lawsuits that challenged this section of the BCRA on First 
Amendment grounds. In McConnell, the Court held the ban 
constitutional, because corporations and unions would “remain 
free to organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for 
[the] purpose” of funding electioneering communications.45 
Importantly, the Court also noted that “Congress’s power to 
prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their 
treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the 
election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been 
firmly embedded in our law.”46 
Prior to Citizens United, the Supreme Court most 
recently grappled with the First Amendment implications of 
  
 40 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 
U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).  
 41 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006).  
 42 Hasen, supra note 32, at 588-89; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2). 
 43 See 11 C.F.R. § 100.6 (2010). 
 44 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United 
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 45 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 894 
(“McConnell permitted federal felony punishment for speech by all corporations, 
including nonprofit ones, that speak on prohibited subjects shortly before federal 
elections.”). McConnell relied heavily on Austin in its analysis and reasoning. Id. at 913 
(“The McConnell Court relied on the antidistortion interest in Austin . . . .”); see also 
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 38, at 33 (“[McConnell] simply relied on Austin . . . .”); 
Wilson, supra note 9, at 2372. 
 46 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203. 
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limiting corporate political expenditures in FEC v. Wisconsin 
Right to Life47 (WRTL). WRTL involved a nonprofit 
organization’s challenge to the BCRA’s ban on the use of 
corporate funds for “electioneering communications” during 
certain preelection time periods—the very provision upheld in 
McConnell.48 WRTL planned to broadcast radio advertisements 
within thirty days of a primary election that would call on 
Wisconsin’s U.S. Senators to stop delaying a vote on President 
George W. Bush’s judicial nominees.49 Despite the Court’s 
purported affirmation of McConnell, the Court construed 
“express advocacy” very narrowly and held that “BCRA § 203 
[was] unconstitutional as applied to WRTL’s [advertisements],” 
because the advertisements exemplified issue advocacy, not 
express advocacy.50 This decision acted as a harbinger of the 
hard-line, antiregulation approach to corporate political 
expenditures that would become the new paradigm.51 
II. CITIZENS UNITED  
On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court decided 
Citizens United v. FEC,52 in which it struck down the ban on 
independent corporate political expenditures53 on First 
Amendment grounds.54 Specifically, the Court held that the 
laws banning corporations from using treasury funds for 
“electioneering communications” unconstitutionally silenced 
political speech.55 The decision extended constitutional 
  
 47 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 48 Id. at 455-56; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207. 
Because the challenge only regarded the BCRA’s application to WRTL’s specific 
situation, it was an “as-applied” challenge. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 456. 
 49 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 458-59. 
 50 Id. at 481. Professor Hasen notes that although it was not facially 
invalidated by the Court, “[t]he new functional equivalency test appeared likely to 
eviscerate [BCRA] § 203.” Hasen, supra note 32, at 590. 
 51 See James A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign 
Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
673, 679-81 (2011) (“Soon after its ruling in McConnell, the Court watered down its 
holding on corporate and union spending by approving an as-applied challenge to the 
very provision of BCRA it had recently upheld.” (citing Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 
456)); Zipkin, supra note 34, at 556. 
 52 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 53 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Section 441b 
makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—
either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast 
electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a 
general election.”).  
 54 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.  
 55 Id. at 913.  
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protection to corporations’ ability to use general-treasury funds 
to make independent political expenditures that are not 
coordinated with candidates for office.56 
A. The Facts 
Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, defines itself 
as “dedicated to restoring our government to citizens’ 
control . . . [t]hrough a combination of education, advocacy, and 
grass roots organization.”57 It accepts donations from 
individuals and from for-profit corporations.58 The suit, which 
would later send shockwaves through the legal and political 
communities, resulted from a film that Citizens United 
produced and released in January 2008 entitled Hillary: The 
Movie (Hillary),59 a ninety-minute documentary about then-
Senator Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for President.60 As the 
Court noted, “Hillary mention[ed] Senator Clinton by name 
and depict[ed] interviews with political commentators and 
other persons, most of them quite critical of Senator Clinton.”61 
Citizens United released the film to theaters and put it out on 
DVD, but the organization also wanted to arrange for 
distribution via video-on-demand and run advertisements on 
broadcast and cable television that included a statement about 
Clinton, the name of the film, and the movie’s web address.62 
Citizens United planned to have at least three of the 
advertisements broadcasted within thirty days before the 2008 
Democratic National Convention and within sixty days before 
the 2008 general election, ostensibly in violation of the BCRA’s 
  
 56 WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 1-2; GARRETT, supra note 13, at 1-2. 
 57 About Citizens United, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/ 
who-we-are.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
 58 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. Professor Hasen has noted that “[b]y 
taking some for-profit corporate money, the corporation appeared ineligible for the 
MCFL exemption.” Hasen, supra note 32, at 591 n.59; see also supra notes 31-32 and 
accompanying text. 
 59 HILLARY: THE MOVIE (Citizens United Productions 2008).  
 60 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
 61 Id. at 887. Professor Hasen has noted that the documentary “contain[ed] a 
great many negative statements” about then-Senator Clinton. Hasen, supra note 32, at 
591-92. 
 62 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (“Video-on-demand allows digital cable 
subscribers to select programming from various menus, including movies, television 
shows, sports, news, and music. The viewer can watch the program at any time and 
can elect to rewind or pause the program.”). The Court noted that they found the 
statements about then-Senator Clinton to be “pejorative.” Id. at 887.  
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ban on electioneering communications within those time 
periods.63 
Before Citizens United, federal campaign-finance law 
prohibited corporations and unions from funding independent 
expenditures that expressly advocated for the election or defeat 
of a candidate (express advocacy) as well as “‘any broadcast, 
cable, or satellite communication’ that ‘refer[red] to a clearly 
identified candidate for Federal office’ and [was] made within 
[thirty] days of a primary or [sixty] days of a general election” 
(electioneering communication).64 As an alternative, federal 
campaign-finance law allowed corporations to establish PACs, 
which could in turn receive donations from shareholders or 
employees of the corporation and make independent political 
expenditures with those funds.65 If the FEC considered Hillary 
and the advertisements to be either express advocacy, 
electioneering communications, or both, then it could have 
subjected Citizens United to civil and criminal penalties.66 
Therefore, Citizens United brought suit to seek declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the FEC regarding those provisions. 
The complaint argued that the prohibition on express advocacy 
and electioneering communications was unconstitutional as 
applied to the film and its advertisements.67 
B. The Analysis and Holding 
The Citizens United decision steeply veered away from 
critical precedents. From the very beginning of the decision, the 
Court justified its enormous step in overturning two major 
decisions, Austin and McConnell, by framing the outcome of the 
case as nearly unavoidable. In its rationalization, the Court 
  
 63 Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2008); see also 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. “[B]oth periods are within BCRA’s definition of an 
electioneering communication.” Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 276. Citizens 
United’s complaint “contain[ed] two major claims: (1) that [the] prohibition of corporate 
disbursements for electioneering communications violates the First Amendment on its 
face and as applied [in this case]; and (2) that [the statute] requiring disclosure 
and . . . disclaimers are unconstitutional as applied” to Citizen United’s movie and 
advertisements. Id. at 277 (footnotes omitted). 
 64 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(A) (2006)); 
see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).  
 65 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887-88; see also supra Part I. 
 66 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888; see also 2 U.S.C. § 437g. 
 67 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888; Amended Verified Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-2240-RCL). 
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explained it could not decide the case on a narrower ground68—
either through statutory interpretation or a limited 
constitutional holding.69 In particular, the Court took great pains 
to explain the lack of opportunity for a ruling based on the more 
limited as-applied challenge brought by Citizens United.70 For 
example, the Court pointed out that because “the District Court 
addressed the facial validity of the statute . . .[,] it [was] necessary 
[for the Court] to consider . . . facial validity” as well.71 The Court 
“decline[d] to adopt an interpretation that require[d] intricate 
case-by-case determinations to verify whether political speech is 
banned[,]” because such a “course of decision would prolong the 
substantial, nation-wide chilling effect caused by [section] 441b’s 
prohibitions on corporate expenditures.”72 The Court’s conclusion 
that it could not pursue narrower grounds and its use of 
statements such as, “First Amendment freedoms need breathing 
space to survive,”73 indicated what would later become the 
sweeping holding of the Court.74  
  
 68 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888 (“[W]e first address whether Citizens 
United’s claim that § 441b cannot be applied to Hillary may be resolved on other, 
narrower grounds.”); see also Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and 
Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
643, 664 (2011) (“The Court [was] determined not to resolve Citizens United’s 
complaint on any . . . narrower grounds . . . .”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction 
About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 946 (2011) (“[T]he Court could have 
held a challenged provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act invalid as 
applied to the party before it, but instead opted to pronounce it invalid on its face.”); 
Harold Anthony Lloyd, A Right but Wrong Place: Righting and Rewriting Citizens 
United, 56 S.D. L. REV. 219, 220 (2011) (The Court “[d]eclin[ed] to decide the case on 
narrower grounds and resurrect[ed] a facial challenge that Citizens United had 
waived . . . .”). 
 69 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 890 (“[T]here is no reasonable interpretation 
of Hillary other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton. Under the standard 
stated in McConnell and further elaborated in WRTL, the film qualifies as the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy.”). The Court also noted that although “the 
Court should construe statutes as necessary to avoid constitutional questions, the 
series of steps suggested would be difficult to take in view of the language of the 
statute.” Id. at 892. 
 70 Id. at 891-92. An as-applied challenge would only raise the question of 
whether the relevant statute was constitutionally invalid in a specific situation. 
However, a facial challenge is a general challenge to the statute itself. Commentators 
have noted that this case ended the Roberts Court’s trend of a “resistance to 
constitutional challenges seeking the facial invalidation of laws . . . .” Patricia Millett et 
al., Mixed Signals: The Roberts Court and Free Speech in the 2009 Term, 5 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 14 (2010).  
 71 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 893. 
 72 Id. at 892, 894. 
 73 Id. at 892 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468-69 
(2007)).  
 74 In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court could and should 
have decided the case on far narrower grounds and that the majority overreached in its 
decision. Id. at 931-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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Next, the Court found it “necessary to consider Citizens 
United’s challenge to Austin and the facial validity of [section] 
441b’s expenditure ban.”75 As discussed above, section 441b 
criminalizes express advocacy or electioneering communications 
by a corporation.76 Although the Court acknowledged that PACs 
provide some alternative for corporations seeking to take part in 
public political discourse, the Court held that the existence of 
this alternative was “burdensome,” “expensive to administer,” 
“subject to extensive regulations,” and thus “[did] not alleviate 
the First Amendment problems with [section] 441b.”77 In 
addition, the Court determined that these practical concerns 
about PACs rendered “[s]ection 441b’s prohibition on corporate 
independent expenditures [as] . . . a ban on speech” whose 
“purpose and effect [were] to silence entities whose voices the 
Government deem[ed] to be suspect.”78 
The Court analyzed section 441b as if it applied to 
individuals, based on the premise that “political speech of 
corporations or other associations should [not] be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because such 
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”79 Therefore, the Court 
considered whether a regulation like section 441b could be 
applied to an individual and concluded that if Congress enacted 
such a regulation, “no one would believe that it [was] merely a 
time, place, or manner restriction on speech.”80 This vast 
  
 75 Id. at 893 (majority opinion). The Court noted that “[a]ny other course of 
decision would prolong the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused by [section] 
441b’s prohibitions on corporate expenditures.” Id. at 894. 
 76 Id. at 897 (“Section 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including 
nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of 
candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within [thirty] days of a 
primary election and [sixty] days of a general election.” (emphasis added)). 
 77 Id. As part of their exploration of the practical concerns about the PAC 
alternative to regular corporate political speech, the Court also found that “[g]iven the 
onerous restrictions, a corporation may not be able to establish a PAC in time to make 
its views known regarding candidates and issues in a current campaign.” Id. at 898. 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 900 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 
(1978)). 
 80 Id. at 898. Generally, time, place, or manner restrictions on speech are 
constitutional. The Court also noted that  
[a]s a practical matter, however, given the complexity of the regulations and 
the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker who 
wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending 
against FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior 
permission to speak. These onerous restrictions thus function as the 
equivalent of prior restraint by giving the FEC power analogous to licensing 
laws implemented in [sixteenth] and [seventeenth] century England, laws 
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disparity between speakers in the political realm doomed 
section 441b’s chance of being upheld as constitutional. The 
Court found that laws that restrict the speech of some 
speakers, but not others, constitute an attempt to control the 
content of the restricted speakers.81 
In addition to analyzing the law’s actual and potential 
effects, the Court assessed the interests the law served in order 
to determine whether its goals justified the means it employed. 
For these types of assessments, the Court employs various 
levels of “scrutiny.” The level of scrutiny applied often plays a 
crucial role in dictating the outcome of a First Amendment 
challenge.82 In Citizens United, the Court stated that “[l]aws 
that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ 
which requires the Government to prove that the restriction 
‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest.’”83 
Under the strict scrutiny analysis, only an interest that 
the Supreme Court recognizes as compelling will justify some of 
the most dubious legislation.84 A narrowly tailored law is one 
that is not over- or underinclusive in serving the compelling 
interest it purports to further. In Citizens United, the Court 
spent most of its energy determining whether a compelling 
interest existed rather than analyzing whether the law was 
narrowly tailored.85 In order to serve a compelling interest in this 
  
and governmental practices of the sort that the First Amendment was drawn 
to prohibit. 
Id. at 895-96 (citations omitted). 
 81 Id. at 898-99 (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among 
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. As instruments to censor, 
these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of the 
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.” (citation omitted)). 
 82 See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, 
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV 1, 4 (2010) 
(“The degree of deference often dictates the result in constitutional cases.”). 
 83 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 
U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). Generally, the Court employs a rational basis test that merely 
requires that the regulation at issue is rationally related to an important governmental 
interest. When the Court uses the rational basis test, it almost always upholds the law 
in question. In contrast, strict scrutiny, the most rigorous test available to the Court 
within existing First Amendment doctrine, almost always results in invalidation of the 
law in question. 
 84 See Keirsten G. Anderson, Note, Protecting Unmarried Cohabitants from 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1017, 1023-24 (1997).  
 85 One commentator has noted that “[t]he Court did not deny that corporate 
political speech does present [certain] problems but believed that the statutory ban was 
both over- and under-inclusive . . . .” Melone, supra note 15, at 86. The Court’s focus on 
whether the law served a compelling interest may indicate that the Court was less 
 
356 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
case, the Court suggested that the regulation would have to 
restrict speech or expenditures that “interfere[d] with 
governmental functions,” such as protecting a school or prison’s 
ability to operate.86 The Court found that this regulation failed to 
support a government function and actually undermined the 
political process by preventing voters from “obtain[ing] 
information from diverse sources,” including corporations, “in 
order to determine how to cast their votes.”87 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that there is “no basis for the proposition that, 
in the context of political speech, the Government may impose 
restrictions [such as section 441b] on certain disfavored 
speakers,” such as corporations.88 
Finally, the Court sought to provide clarity regarding its 
decision to overrule Austin and partially overrule McConnell. 
The Court based its departure from Austin and McConnell on 
the ground that “[t]he ongoing chill upon speech that is beyond 
all doubt protected makes it necessary in this case to invoke 
the earlier precedents that a statute [that] chills speech can 
and must be invalidated where its . . . invalidity has been 
demonstrated.”89 Specifically, the Court held that the pre-
Austin line of precedent, as exemplified by Bellotti, forbids any 
restriction on political speech on the basis of the speaker’s 
corporate identity.90 In addition, the Court found that the post-
Austin line of precedent would have erroneously permitted 
such a restriction as justified by an interest in preventing 
distortion of speech within the political process.91 
As in previous cases, the Court focused on the 
compelling governmental interest prong of the strict scrutiny 
test rather than on the breadth prong. In Austin, the Court 
identified the “compelling governmental interest” as 
“preventing ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of 
  
concerned with the scope of the solution and more concerned with the definition of the 
problem that the solution sought to address. 
 86 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. The Court noted that it had “upheld a 
narrow class of speech restrictions that operate[d] to the disadvantage of certain 
persons, but th[o]se rulings were based on an interest in allowing government entities 
to perform their functions.” Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
683 (1986); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); Parker 
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974); Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 
557 (1973)). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 896 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 482-83 (2007)). 
 90 Id. at 898-99 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
 91 Id. at 903-04. 
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the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’”92 The 
Court did not take issue with the justification itself but instead 
focused on the practical outcomes of accepting that justification 
as a compelling governmental interest. For example, the Court 
stressed that if “the antidistortion rationale were to be 
accepted, . . . it would permit Government to ban political 
speech simply because the speaker is an association that has 
taken on the corporate form.”93 The Court cast aside the Austin 
Court’s reliance on the antidistortion rationale as “an 
aberration” and held that the true “purpose and effect of 
[section 441b] is to prevent corporations, including small and 
nonprofit corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions 
to the public.”94 Therefore, the Court overruled Austin and part 
of McConnell95 because section 441b was an “unlawful”96 and 
“troubling assertion of brooding governmental power.”97 
Instead, the Court chose to “return to the principle . . . that the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of 
the speaker’s corporate identity.”98 
  
 92 Id. at 903 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 
660 (1990)). 
 93 Id. at 904. The Court also noted the Government’s argument “that Austin 
permits [the Government] to ban corporate expenditures for almost all forms of 
communication stemming from a corporation.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court brought 
the Government’s argument to what it viewed as its logical conclusion and found that “[i]f 
Austin were correct, the Government could prohibit a corporation from expressing 
political views in media beyond those presented here, such as by printing books.” Id. For 
an extensive discussion of the antidistortion rationale, see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens 
United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989 (2011).  
 94 Id. at 907. The Court also noted that under section 441b, “certain 
disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are 
penalized for engaging in the same political speech” as wealthy individuals and 
unincorporated associates, who could “spend unlimited amounts on independent 
expenditures.” Id. at 908 (citation omitted). 
 95 Citizens United “overruled the portion of McConnell facially upholding the 
electioneering-communication prohibition. As a result, the [Court’s] language about 
government being able to prohibit ‘functional equivalent of express advocacy’ is gone.” 
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 38, at 58 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913); see 
also Wilson, supra note 9, at 2365 (Citizens United overruled “the portion of 
[McConnell] that restricted independent corporate expenditures, as codified in section 
203 of [BCRA]” (citations omitted)).  
 96 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. 
 97 Id. at 904.  
 98 Id. at 913. The Court based this conclusion on its holding that “[n]o 
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or 
for-profit corporations.” Id. 
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III. MANDATORY SHAREHOLDER-APPROVAL PROPOSALS 
After Citizens United, lawmakers,99 journalists,100 and 
think tanks101 proposed several versions of a mandatory 
shareholder-approval scheme in an attempt to rein in the new 
political rights granted to corporations.102 Three of the most 
prominent proposals include the End the Hijacking of 
Shareholder Funds Act,103 the Shareholder Protection Act of 
2010,104 and the Brennan Center for Justice’s proposal.105 
Although the three proposals are similar, they have important 
distinctions that may bear upon the constitutionality of their 
limitations on corporate speech under the First Amendment.106  
A. End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act 
On January 21, 2010, the same day the Court handed 
down its decision in Citizens United, U.S. Representative Alan 
Grayson responded by introducing the End the Hijacking of 
Shareholder Funds Act (Shareholder Funds Act).107 At barely 
  
 99 See, e.g., End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th 
Cong. § 2 (2010); Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010). 
 100 See, e.g., Alter, supra note 19 (“New laws regulating corporate governance 
are also essential. Britain requires shareholders to vote on corporate political 
expenditures. We should do the same . . . .”).  
 101 See, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, 
at 1; Craig Holman, House Committee Passes Important Checks on Corporate Spending 
on Elections, PUB. CITIZEN (July 29, 2010), http://citizenvox.org/2010/07/29/house-
committee-passes-important-checks-on-corporate-spending-on-elections/ (“Shareholders 
should have a say on how their money is spent.”). 
 102 One commentator’s analysis of past corporate political spending “suggest[s] 
that corporations and unions were major players on the political stage even before 
Citizens United, and it is unclear how much the Court’s ruling is likely to change that 
influence.” Gilpatrick, supra note 27, at 412. 
 103 End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 104 Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 105 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23; Torres-
Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18. Since Professor Torres-
Spelliscy’s book chapter details the general proposal of the published report, this note 
will consider both publications in tandem as one proposal. 
 106 This note will only discuss the shareholder approval proposals. It will not 
discuss any proposed disclosure requirements because they are not relevant for the 
purposes of the First Amendment analysis under Citizens United. In addition, it is of 
interest that these proposals were put forth during a “trend toward shareholder 
empowerment.” See Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 641, 
655-58 (2011). 
 107 End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. 
(2010). Representative Grayson lost his bid for reelection on November 2, 2010. Elspeth 
Reeve, What Will Crazy Alan Grayson Do Next?, ATLANTIC WIRE (Nov. 2, 2010, 10:58 
PM), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2010/11/what-will-crazy-alan-grayson-do-
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two pages, the Shareholder Funds Act would, if enacted, 
require that “[a]ny expenditure by a public company to 
influence public opinion on matters not related to the 
company’s products or services” have the approval of a 
“majority of the votes cast by shareholders.”108 Expenditures 
without this approval would “be considered a breach of a 
fiduciary duty of the officers and directors who authorized such 
an expenditure.”109 For such a breach, those officers and 
directors would be personally liable to the company’s 
shareholders for the amount of the expenditure.110 Although 
seemingly simple and straightforward, the proposed bill is too 
brief for Congress to take it seriously as a piece of legislation 
that could be enacted in its current form. It has many 
definitional issues and details that require resolution before 
enactment could occur. For example, the bill defines only two 
terms—“public company” and “shareholder.” A “public 
company” is defined as “any issuer that is required to submit 
periodical or other reports under section 13 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. [§] 78m)” and “shareholder” is 
defined as “any person who owns or holds a share of stock in a 
public company.”111 In addition, the Shareholder Funds Act does 
not define those matters that “influence public opinion” or 
those matters that do—or do not—“relate[] to the company’s 
products or services.”112 These definitional deficiencies raise 
many questions. Are institutional shareholders, such as mutual 
or pension funds, given votes under the definition? Do 
shareholders have just one vote, or one vote for each share of 
stock they own? Despite its incompleteness, the bill is 
important because it likely provided the basis for the 
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010,113 later proposed by U.S. 
Representative Michael Capuano. 
  
next/22443/. It remains to be seen whether this proposed legislation will survive 
despite his absence from Congress.  
 108 End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).  
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. (stating that officers and directors would be jointly and severally liable). 
 111 Id. § 3. 
 112 Id. § 2. Not only would these definitional issues be difficult for a 
corporation, an attorney, or a court to interpret, but they may very well render this bill 
unconstitutionally vague, even without reference to the inevitable First Amendment 
strict scrutiny analysis that it would have to survive. 
 113 Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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B. Shareholder Protection Act 
Introduced six days after Citizens United was decided, 
H.R. 4537, or the Shareholder Protection Act of 2010 
(Shareholder Protection Act),114 is just over eight pages long—
four times as long as the Shareholder Funds Act. The 
Shareholder Protection Act would amend section 14 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to require any issuer 
of securities115 to obtain “written affirmative authorization” 
from a majority of its shareholders before spending more than 
$10,000 in a given fiscal year on political expenditures.116 Like 
the Shareholder Funds Act, the Shareholder Protection Act 
would consider a violation of the prior-approval requirement as 
a “breach of fiduciary duty of the officers and directors who 
authorized” the political expenditure, and those officers and 
directors would be “jointly and severally liable . . . for the 
amount of such expenditure.”117 The bill defines political 
expenditures very broadly—beyond the types of activities that 
section 441b covered before Citizens United. In addition to 
covering corporate independent political expenditures targeted 
by section 441b, this proposal would also cover expenditures for 
voter registration campaigns and trade association dues.118 
  
 114 Id.  
 115 “Issuer” is defined by the federal securities laws as “any person who issues 
or proposes to issue any security [or] . . . the person or persons performing the acts and 
assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of [a] trust or 
other agreement or instrument under which such securities are issued . . . .” Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2006). A “person” is defined 
broadly in federal securities law as “a natural person, company, government, or 
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government.” Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9); 2 U.S.C. § 434 (f) (2006).  
 116 Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. § 3(d) (2010). 
The bill defines “affirmative authorization” as “the full, free, and written consent of a 
shareholder, obtained without intimidation or fear of reprisal, and shall not include 
votes made by a broker or any other representative.” Id. By not including brokers or 
representatives, it is unclear whether the bill would allow for institutional investors, 
mutual funds, or hedge funds to vote either for or against approval of political 
expenditures. The bill defines “majority of all shareholders” as the “number of 
shareholders that combined own more than 50 percent of all outstanding shares. 
Shareholders not casting votes shall not count toward such a majority.” Id.  
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. The bill defines “expenditure for political activities” as  
(i) expenditures in support of, or opposition to, any Federal, State, or local 
candidate; (ii) contributions to or expenditures in support of any political 
party, committee, electioneering communication, voter registration campaign, 
ballot measure campaign, or an issue advocacy campaign; and (iii) dues or 
other payments to trade associations or other tax exempt organizations that 
are, or could reasonably be anticipated to be, used for the purposes described 
in subparagraphs [(i) and (ii)].  
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In recognition of the special treatment by the Court of 
media corporations in Bellotti and Citizens United,119 the 
Shareholder Protection Act includes an exception for issuers 
“whose sole business is the publication or broadcasting of news, 
commentary, literature, music, entertainment, artistic 
expression, scientific, historical or academic works, or other 
forms of information.”120 The bill would require the Securities 
and Exchange Commission to issue “guidance as it determines 
necessary or appropriate regarding the extent of the 
exemption.”121 Although more detailed than the Shareholder 
Funds Act, the Shareholder Protection Act would actually cover 
a broader group of corporations. While the Shareholder Funds 
Act would only cover public companies,122 the Shareholder 
Protection Act would cover all issuers of securities, including 
some private corporations and many small businesses.123 
C. Brennan Center for Justice Proposal 
On the same day that Representative Capuano 
introduced the Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, the 
Brennan Center for Justice published a proposal (Brennan 
Center Proposal) that would “require shareholder 
authorization of future corporate political spending.”124 The 
Brennan Center Proposal has the same two essential elements 
as the Shareholder Funds Act and the Shareholder Protection 
Act; it would require “corporations [to] obtain the consent of 
shareholders before making political expenditures” and it 
would “hold corporate directors personally liable for violations 
of these policies.”125 In addition, the Brennan Center Proposal 
  
Id. Section 441b banned corporations from using treasury funds for independent 
expenditures and electioneering communications in close proximity to elections. 2 
U.S.C. § 441b. 
 119 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978); Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905-06 (2010). 
 120 Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010). 
 121 Id. This provision has the potential to bring the Securities and Exchange 
Commission into conflict with the FEC, which is tasked with providing guidance on 
federal campaign-finance law. 
 122 End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010). 
 123 H.R. 4537 § 3. However, the bill would carve out some limited exceptions. 
See id. § 3(d).  
 124 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 4.  
 125 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 21. This 
proposal would not hold corporate officers liable, as would be the case under the 
Shareholder Funds Act or the Shareholder Protection Act. See Torres-Spelliscy, 
Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, (manuscript at 74) (proposing that “[i]f a 
corporation makes an unauthorized contribution or expenditure for a political activity, 
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includes disclosure requirements that are undoubtedly 
constitutional126 and helpful to shareholders that would 
facilitate the BCRA’s central goal of a transparent democracy.127 
Like the proposed bills’ provisions, these requirements would 
amend federal securities law.128 
The Brennan Center Proposal would require an “annual 
shareholder vote to authorize any spending of $10,000 or more” 
by a corporation for any political activity, but the corporation 
may also request authorization more frequently.129 The proposal 
defines “political activity” as “any contributions or expenditures 
made directly or indirectly to, or in support of or opposition to, 
any candidate, political party, committee, electioneering 
communication, ballot measure campaign, or . . . issue 
advocacy campaign.”130 For shareholder approval, the 
corporation’s proposed political spending must receive a 
majority vote from the corporation’s shareholders, defined 
  
then the directors at the time that the unauthorized contribution or expenditure was 
incurred are jointly and severally liable to repay to the corporation the amount of the 
unauthorized expenditure, with interest at the rate of eight percent per annum” 
(emphasis added)).  
 126 For example, the Brennan Center Proposal urges Congress to require 
disclosure of political spending . . . frequent enough to notify shareholders 
and the investing public of corporate spending habits, and yet with enough of 
a time lag between reports so that corporations are not unduly burdened. To 
accommodate these two competing goals, disclosure of political expenditures 
should occur quarterly to coincide with company’s filing of its Form 10-Qs 
with SEC. Because the political disclosure will be contemporaneous with the 
10-Q filing, transaction costs can be minimized. 
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 21; see also Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (upholding disclosure requirements); WHITAKER, 
supra note 13, at 5. For a discussion supporting increased disclosure requirements, see 
Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After 
Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1061-64 (2011). However, one commentator has 
argued that many disclosure regimes, including the DISCLOSE Act, may not be 
constitutional under Citizens United due to the Court’s concern about the complexity of 
campaign finance regulation. See Briffault, supra note 68, at 645-46, 668-70. 
 127 As the author of the Brennan Center Proposal has stated, “disclosure of 
past political expenditures empowers the shareholder to anticipate whether future 
political spending is likely to conform with his or her political views.” Torres-Spelliscy, 
Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, (manuscript at 66); see also WHITAKER, 
supra note 13, at 7.  
 128 This portion of the proposal would amend section 14 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. See Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 
23, (manuscript at 73). 
 129 Id. This proposal would cover “[a]ny corporation where proxies are solicited 
in respect of any security registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act occurring on 
or after the date . . . on which final rules are issued . . . .” Id. 
 130 Id. at 72. This proposal expressly excludes “activities defined as lobbying 
under any local, state or federal law.” Id. 
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explicitly to include institutional investors.131 In addition, the 
Brennan Center Proposal includes a provision that would 
require institutional investment managers to publicly disclose 
how they voted on such political spending authorizations.132 By 
contrast, neither of the proposed bills addresses institutional 
investment managers—such as the managers of mutual, 
pension, or hedge funds—that often play crucial roles in 
securing shareholder majorities.133  
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY 
SHAREHOLDER-APPROVAL PROPOSALS 
After these proposals were put forth, the Congressional 
Research Service134 raised the question of whether lawmakers 
could draft a mandatory shareholder-approval law in a way 
that would not “violat[e] the corporation’s free speech rights as 
described by Citizens United.”135 In order to pass constitutional 
muster and comply with Citizens United, the law or regulation 
must not infringe upon the corporation’s right to free speech as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.136  
  
 131 Id. at 74. “Majority of all shareholders” is defined as “a vote of 
shareholders that combined own 50 percent plus one of all outstanding shares. 
Shareholders not casting votes shall not count toward affirmative authorization under 
this [proposal].” Id. at 72. 
 132 Id. at 74 (proposing that “[e]very institutional investment manager subject 
to section 13(f) of the Exchange Act shall report at least annually how it voted on any 
shareholder vote . . . unless such vote is otherwise required to be reported publicly by 
rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission.”). 
 133 As of 2002, 58 percent of U.S. equities were owned by institutional 
investors, a percentage that has risen nearly every year. Murat Binay, Performance 
Attribution of US Institutional Investors, FIN. MGMT., Summer 2005, at 127, 128. For 
further discussion of institutional shareholders in light of Citizens United, see Melone, 
supra note 15, at 85; Osterlind, supra note 16, at 281. 
 134 Congressional Research Service, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Nov. 2, 2010), 
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/ (“The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works 
exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to 
committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. 
As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued 
and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.”).  
 135 WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 8; see also GARRETT, supra note 13, at 6 (stating 
that this proposal “could raise questions about whether the requirements were essentially 
stifling corporate political speech”). The Congressional Research Service also notes that 
“[t]he practicalities of . . . enforcement of this kind of legislation may need to be carefully 
considered in order not to run afoul of corporate freedom of speech rights defined by the 
Supreme Court in Citizens United.” WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 8. 
 136 Although the “Constitution’s Commerce Clause may arguably provide 
Congress with authority to enact legislation of the type in question,” the First 
Amendment must also be satisfied. WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 7 (citing U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
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The First Amendment states, in relevant part, that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”137 All three proposals would create 
significant barriers, constitutional or not, to corporate political 
speech on multiple levels. When a law has the potential to 
burden political speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny.138 To 
survive this test, the government must show that the 
regulation advances a compelling governmental interest and is 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.139 Therefore, the 
proposals must meet this exacting standard to pass muster.140 
In order to overcome this burden, three interests have been set 
forth to justify the proposals—anticorruption, anticorrosion, 
and shareholder protection. 
A. Anticorruption 
The restrictions on speech embodied in the three proposals 
must advance a compelling governmental interest in order to 
survive strict scrutiny. The first potential compelling 
governmental interest is anticorruption. In Austin, Justice 
Marshall, writing for the majority, found that independent 
expenditures had the potential to cause “real or apparent 
corruption.”141 Although the Austin Court acknowledged that 
direct contributions more naturally raised a concern about 
“‘financial quid pro quo’”142 than independent expenditures, it 
recognized that the prevention of this type of corruption provided 
a “‘compelling governmental interest . . . [for] the restriction of the 
influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate 
form.’”143 Accordingly, the Austin Court held that corporations had 
no constitutional right to make independent campaign 
expenditures out of their general treasuries.144 
  
 137 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 138 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). 
 139 Id.  
 140 In addition to a constitutional law analysis, corporate law considerations 
must be considered when evaluating the proposals discussed in this note. For 
arguments against the proposals on corporate law grounds, see Stephen A. Yoder, 
Legislative Intervention in Corporate Governance Is Not a Necessary Response to 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 29 J.L. & COM. 1, 15-21 (2010). 
 141 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (citing 
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978)). 
 142 Id. (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 
480, 497 (1985)) (emphasis omitted). 
 143 Id. (quoting Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 500-01). 
 144 Id. at 655. 
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In McConnell, Justices Stevens and O’Connor, writing 
for the majority, expanded the breadth of anticorruption as a 
compelling governmental interest. The McConnell Court stated 
that Congress had a legitimate interest in stopping corruption, 
or the appearance thereof, well beyond eliminating mere “cash-
for-votes” schemes.145 The Court held that this rationale 
extended to preventing “‘improper influence’” and 
“‘opportunities for abuse,’” including those that arose from 
elected officials who were “‘too compliant with the wishes of 
large contributors.’”146 In their decision, Justices Stevens and 
O’Connor also dug deeper than the Austin Court to uncover 
what they essentially cast as the “real world” of political 
campaign financing. For example, they quoted many former 
lobbyists and members of Congress when they discussed the high-
level influence and access gained through large independent 
corporate expenditures.147 The majority’s emphasis on the 
practical effect of the campaign-financing scheme reflected the 
Court’s concern with current political realities rather than with 
the theoretical implications of such regulations. 
Unlike the majority opinions of the Austin and 
McConnell Courts, the anticorruption rationale as a compelling 
governmental interest found popularity only with the dissent 
in Citizens United. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, argued 
that the Citizens United Court construed the anticorruption 
interest too narrowly and that it actually encompasses more 
than just quid pro quo corruption.148 Rather, he argued that the 
compelling governmental interest also included the prevention 
of independent expenditures from having an “undue influence 
on an office holder’s judgment” or from generating an 
“appearance of such influence.”149 
  
 145 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003). 
 146 Id. at 143 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 
(2000)). One commentator has noted that “Justice Kennedy distinguished corruption 
from ‘favoritism and influence,’ which were ‘not . . . avoidable in representative 
politics.’” Eliza P. Nagel, Note, For the People or Despite the People: The Threat of 
Corporations’ Growing Power Through Citizens United and the Demise of the Honest 
Services Law, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 725, 760 (2011) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 
130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010)) 
 147 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150-52. 
 148 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 961 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. (citations omitted). Justice Stevens elaborated that 
[c]orruption can take many forms. Bribery may be the paradigm case. But the 
difference between selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not 
kind. And selling access is not qualitatively different from giving special 
preference to those who spent money on one’s behalf. Corruption operates 
along a spectrum, and the majority’s apparent belief that quid pro quo 
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Justice Kennedy’s view of the anticorruption rationale 
was far narrower in Citizens United.150 As expressed in the 
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy defined the anticorruption 
rationale as only applying to quid pro quo corruption—
essentially only bribery—and not as encompassing the broader 
definition that Justice Stevens advocated.151 In addition, Justice 
Kennedy articulated what appeared to be a different conception 
of democracy than that held by Justice Stevens. Rather than 
viewing politicians’ reactions to corporate expenditures as a 
sign of corruption, Justice Kennedy viewed the give-and-take 
between politicians and corporations as the relationship that 
should exist between representatives and their constituents.152 
Instead of perceiving responsiveness to corporate interests as 
corruption, Justice Kennedy found such responsiveness to be of 
a democratic nature—which should be enjoyed by all 
constituents.153 Most importantly, the Citizens United Court, 
through Justice Kennedy, concluded that independent 
expenditures by corporations, by their nature, “do not give rise 
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”154  
There is a plausible argument that mandatory 
shareholder approval would further the anticorruption interest, 
as broadly defined by Justice Stevens in his dissent. The 
premise of the proposals is that they will likely reduce the 
amount of money that corporations, in the aggregate, spend on 
political causes. However, no plausible argument exists that 
  
arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences does 
not accord with the theory or reality of politics.  
Id. 
 150 For a critical view of Justice Kennedy’s definition of corruption in Citizens 
United, see Andrew T. Newcomer, Comment, The “Crabbed View of Corruption”: How 
the U.S. Supreme Court Has Given Corporations the Green Light to Gain Influence over 
Politicians by Spending on Their Behalf, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 267-71 (2010). 
 151 See Kang, supra note 9, at 250 (“Justice Kennedy’s view of corruption may 
limit campaign finance restrictions to not much beyond the regulation of contributions 
to candidates and officeholders.”); Peterman, supra note 12, at 1175-78. 
 152 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (“The fact that speakers 
may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials 
are corrupt.”). 
 153 Id. (“It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain 
policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support 
those policies . . . . Democracy is founded on responsiveness.” (quoting McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part))). 
 154 Id. at 909. “By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech 
presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. The fact that a 
corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters 
presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials.” Id. at 
910 (citation omitted).  
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these proposals would further the narrower definition of 
anticorruption stated in Citizens United by Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion. The inferential connection between 
shareholder approval of independent political expenditures and 
the prevention of quid pro quo corruption is tenuous. As the 
Citizens United Court expressly stated, the independent 
character of the expenditures makes them—by the expenditures’ 
very nature—incapable of creating a quid pro quo relationship, 
because, by definition, it is unlawful for those who make 
independent expenditures to coordinate with a candidate for 
federal office.155 Therefore, the anticorruption rationale cannot 
serve as a compelling governmental interest for the mandatory 
shareholder-approval proposals. 
B. Anticorrosion 
The second potentially compelling governmental 
interest is anticorrosion. In Austin, Justice Marshall, writing 
for the majority, found that in addition to the government’s 
interest in preventing real or apparent corruption, the 
government had a compelling interest in preventing 
corporations from unfairly influencing elections through 
independent expenditures.156 The Austin Court differentiated 
between independent expenditures by individuals and those by 
corporations on the ground that corporations benefited from 
“the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates 
the amassing of large treasuries.”157 Based on this finding, the 
Court held that corporations’ “immense aggregations of wealth” 
had the potential to be “corrosive” in the political arena 
because the independent expenditures funded by that wealth 
“have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”158 
Justice Scalia rejected the Court’s categorization of 
anticorrosion as a compelling governmental interest in a 
dissenting opinion in Austin. Instead, Justice Scalia called 
corrosion the “New Corruption” and argued that the attempt to 
fight so-called corrosion was actually an effort by the Court to 
  
 155 Id. at 909-11. 
 156 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. The Court further stated that the legislation in question “does not 
attempt to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections, rather, it ensures 
that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by 
corporations.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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mandate that “[e]xpenditures must reflect actual public support 
for the political ideas espoused.”159 The Court could use this type 
of equalization rationale, Justice Scalia argued, to restrict 
“virtually anything [it] deems politically undesirable.”160 Relying 
on the Court’s holding in Buckley v. Valeo161 that independent 
expenditures raise little risk of corruption, Justice Scalia 
concluded that the Court’s reasoning cannot be reconciled 
“unless one thinks it would be lawful to prohibit men and 
women whose net worth is above a certain figure from endorsing 
political candidates.”162 
In Citizens United, the Court rejected Austin’s 
anticorrosion interest on the basis that it was essentially an 
interest in equalizing speech.163 Echoing Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Austin, the Court noted that any interest in equalizing speech 
in the political realm had been rejected as early as Buckley.164 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing in concurrence, argued that 
Austin’s reasoning was in conflict “with Buckley’s explicit 
repudiation of any government interest in equalizing the 
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the 
outcome of elections.”165 The Court restored the clear distinction 
between independent expenditures and contributions with the 
potential for corruption or corrosion and noted that independent 
expenditures simply create little or no risk of either problem. 
In the context of the mandatory shareholder-approval 
proposals, a plausible argument exists that the proposals will 
serve the anticorrosion interest, as explained by Justice Marshall 
in Austin. The premise of the proposals is that they will likely 
reduce the amount of money that corporations, in the aggregate, 
spend on political causes. After Citizens United, however, there is 
little possibility that the Court will recognize an anticorrosion 
interest, much less one that would justify restrictions on 
independent expenditures. Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
  
 159 Id. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 160 Id.  
 161 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley involved a constitutional challenge to the 
Federal Election Campaign Act by various candidates for federal office, political 
parties, and organizations. The Court upheld provisions limiting individual 
contributions to campaigns but invalidated provisions that limited the amount a 
candidate could spend on his own election and the total expenditures for particular 
campaigns. Id. at 58-59. 
 162 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 163 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903-04 (2010).  
 164 Id. at 904. 
 165 Id. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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majority, made it clear that the Court has found the anticorrosion 
interest as the equivalent of speech equalization, and Buckley 
strongly prohibits speech equalization as a compelling 
government interest.166 Therefore, the anticorrosion rationale 
cannot serve as a compelling governmental interest for the 
mandatory shareholder-approval proposals. 
C. Shareholder Protection 
In the wake of Citizens United, it is unlikely that the 
Court will uphold a mandatory shareholder-approval law, or 
any restriction on corporate independent expenditures, on the 
basis of the anticorruption or anticorrosion rationales.167 The 
Citizens United Court construed the anticorruption rationale 
narrowly and dismissed the anticorrosion rationale entirely. 
Because neither of these interests has the potential to function 
as the compelling governmental interest needed to justify the 
mandatory shareholder-approval proposals, another potential 
interest must exist for the proposals to pass constitutional 
muster. Those in favor of limits on corporate expenditures, the 
supporters of the BCRA and lamenters of Citizens United, have 
now focused their attention on the one rationale left standing 
after Citizens United: the shareholder-protection interest.168 
The mandatory shareholder-approval proposals are 
based on the premise that shareholders need new regulations 
to protect them in light of the rights afforded to corporations 
under Citizens United. In particular, the concern is that 
publicly traded companies will spend money invested by 
shareholders in a way that may overlook the interests of the 
shareholders and instead support the managers’ personal 
  
 166 Id. at 904 (majority opinion). 
 167 See Kang, supra note 9, at 245 (noting “the fact that a government 
restriction makes shareholder speech more difficult is obviously insufficient by itself to 
justify a constitutional prohibition of that restriction”). 
 168 See Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, 
(manuscript at 69). However, one commentator has argued that in the Citizen United 
Court’s “majority opinion, Justice Kennedy reject[ed] the shareholder protection 
interest as a reason for restricting corporate speech” and “that corporate democracy 
mechanisms should be even more effective today than they would have been at the 
time the [BCRA] was passed . . . .” Yoder, supra note 140, at 11. For a policy-based 
criticism of the shareholder-protection rationale, see David G. Yosifon, The Public 
Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens 
United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1228-30 (2011). 
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political agendas or otherwise damage the corporation.169 The 
proponents of mandating shareholder approval of such 
expenditures hope to curb “unfettered corporate political 
spending” and eliminate the risk of corporate “managers’ 
potentially profligate spending on politics.”170 
The Court first identified shareholder protection as a 
governmental interest in Bellotti,171 the same case that 
recognized the political speech rights of corporations.172 In 
Bellotti, the Court struck down a state statute that banned 
corporate political expenditures on referenda unrelated to that 
corporation’s proprietary interests.173 Similar to the method for 
examining a statute for narrow tailoring, the Bellotti Court’s 
“fit” analysis essentially saw the potential for shareholder 
democracy as a less burdensome alternative to regulation and 
assessed whether the statute was over- or underinclusive.174 
Because the Court based its holding on the statute’s failure 
under the “fit” analysis, the Court did not reach the issue of 
whether shareholder protection can serve as a compelling 
governmental interest.175 
The shareholder-protection issue was also raised but not 
addressed conclusively in MCFL.176 Unlike the for-profit 
corporation and referendum-campaign context in Bellotti, the 
MCFL Court had to resolve a First Amendment challenge in a 
situation that involved a nonprofit corporation and an election 
for political office.177 Because the entity at issue was a nonprofit 
corporation, which by nature does not have shareholders, no 
potential existed for board members to spend shareholder 
  
 169 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 9-10; see 
also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who 
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 90-94 (2010). 
 170 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 8-9. 
However, “[s]imply making independent speakers jump through more regulatory hoops 
may not create any curbing effect in the real world . . . .” Note, Restoring Electoral 
Equilibrium in the Wake of Constitutionalized Campaign Finance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1528, 1546 (2011). Furthermore, one commentator has argued that “reformers who 
insist on limiting the political arena of corporate speech greatly exaggerate the effect 
that such speech has on political outcomes.” Melone, supra note 15, at 94; see also 
Bingham, supra note 126, at 1047 (“[I]t is questionable whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC will alter the way corporations spend 
money on federal elections at all.”). 
 171 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792, 795 (1978) (The 
protection of “corporate shareholders [is] an interest that is . . . legitimate.”). 
 172 Id. at 780. 
 173 Id. at 791-92; see also Lambert, supra note 29, at 21. 
 174 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793-94. 
 175 Id. at 795. 
 176 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986). 
 177 Id. at 241-42. 
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investments on political expenditures without their consent.178 
Instead, the members of MCFL joined the organization because 
they agreed with its political or ideological purpose.179 On that 
basis, the Court held that ideological nonprofits that do not 
take corporate or union donations could not be banned from 
spending their treasury funds on explicit political advocacy.180 
The Austin Court built on the shareholder-protection 
rationale discussed in Bellotti and MCFL and held that 
corporations had no constitutional right to make independent 
campaign expenditures out of their general treasuries,181 
although they could support issue advocacy that mentioned 
specific candidates.182 In upholding a state law that banned 
nonmedia corporations from using corporate funds from their 
general treasuries to make independent expenditures on behalf 
of, or against, state electoral candidates,183 the Court found that 
the shareholders’ ability to withdraw from corporate 
association as a result of political expenditures would not 
sufficiently protect them.184 Thus, the Austin Court concluded 
there was a compelling governmental interest in “preventing a 
corporation . . . from exploiting those who do not wish to 
contribute to [its] political message.”185 
  
 178 Id. at 241 (“MCFL was incorporated . . . as a nonprofit, nonstock 
corporation under Massachusetts law.”). 
 179 Id. at 242. MCFL’s “resources come from voluntary donations from 
‘members,’ and from various fundraising activities such as garage sales, bake sales, 
dances, raffles, and picnics. The corporation considers its ‘members’ those persons who 
have either contributed to the organization in the past or indicated support for its 
activities.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 180 Id. at 262-64. The shareholder-protection interest was not a basis for the 
decision because, as a nonprofit corporation, MCFL had “members,” not “shareholders.” 
 181 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).  
 182 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 38, at 32. 
 183 Austin, 494 U.S. at 654. 
 184 See id. at 663. The Court did point out that similar to MCFL,  
the Chamber also lacks shareholders, [but] many of its members may 
be . . . reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree with the 
Chamber’s political expression, because they wish to benefit from the 
Chamber’s nonpolitical programs and to establish contacts with other 
members of the business community. The Chamber’s political agenda is 
sufficiently distinct from its educational and outreach programs that 
members who disagree with the former may continue to pay dues to 
participate in the latter . . . . Thus, we are persuaded that the Chamber’s 
members are more similar to shareholders of a business corporation than to 
the members of MCFL.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 185 Id. at 675. On a practical level, the Court voiced concern that “shareholders 
in a large business corporation may find it prohibitively expensive to monitor the 
activities of the corporation to determine whether it is making expenditures to which 
they object.” Id. at 674 n.5. 
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In Citizens United, the Court returned to essentially the 
same shareholder-protection analysis set forth in Bellotti—a 
three-part “fit” inquiry that examined (1) whether corporate 
democracy can adequately protect shareholders, (2) whether the 
statute purportedly protecting shareholders is overinclusive, and 
(3) whether the statute purportedly protecting shareholders is 
underinclusive.186 If corporate democracy, as a less restrictive 
means, can adequately protect shareholders or if the statute is 
either over- or underinclusive, then the statute is constitutionally 
invalid. The Citizens United Court found that the relevant portion 
of the BCRA failed on all three parts of the inquiry because 
voluntary corporate democracy protected shareholders’ interests 
adequately in this situation, and the statute was both over- and 
underinclusive.187 The Court found the BCRA overinclusive in its 
coverage of all corporations—including those with merely one 
shareholder—and underinclusive in its ban on electioneering 
communications taking effect only during specific time periods.188 
In overruling Austin, the Citizens United Court also cast 
aside the Austin Court’s formulation of shareholder protection as 
a compelling governmental interest.189 Justice Kennedy stated 
that the current structure of corporate democracy is able to 
adequately protect shareholders’ interests.190 The Court did not 
suggest that legislation was needed to strengthen or mandate 
those procedures, nor did it suggest that the voluntary nature of 
corporate democracy created an independent issue.191 
The Shareholder Funds Act, the Shareholder Protection 
Act, and the Brennan Center Proposal are all aimed ostensibly 
at the protection of shareholders. Beyond the suggestion in 
Citizens United that the current structure of corporate 
democracy can serve to protect this interest without further 
legislation, the next barrier that the proposals must overcome 
is whether they are narrowly tailored to the interest of 
  
 186 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010); First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978). 
 187 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.  
 188 Id. 
 189 Id.; see also John C. Coates, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political 
Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth? 16 (Harvard L. 
& Econ., Discussion Paper No. 684, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1680861 (“In Citizens United, the Supreme Court relaxed the ability of 
corporations to spend money on elections, and in so doing, the Court rejected a 
shareholder-protection rationale for restrictions on spending.”). 
 190 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (“There is . . . little evidence of abuse 
that cannot be corrected by shareholders through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 191 See id. 
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shareholder protection.192 In order to reach this analysis, this 
note assumes for the sake of argument that the Court could 
find shareholder protection to be a compelling governmental 
interest for this type of legislation. 
1. End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act 
The Shareholder Funds Act will likely fail a “narrowly 
tailored” analysis because it contains three aspects that render 
it overinclusive. First, the Act covers a far broader scope of 
political spending than just independent political expenditures, 
which is the narrow class of speech that Citizens United 
suggested that shareholders may have an interest in voluntarily 
restricting.193 Instead, this bill would sweepingly cover all 
expenditures to influence public opinion in a way that only 
indirectly relates to that corporation’s products or services.194 
This overbreadth has the potential to restrict speech well beyond 
the political realm and include environmentally supportive 
speech and many general goodwill advertising campaigns that 
do not actually “relate” to products or services.195 There is little 
basis to suggest that the government can restrict these types of 
speech properly under the First Amendment.196  
  
 192 Some commentators have argued that rather than creating a new burden 
for corporate political speech, the mandatory shareholder approval proposals simply 
legislate the “corporate democracy” that Justice Kennedy referenced in his opinion. See 
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 160, at 90-94. However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion put 
strong emphasis on using the least restrictive means possible to ameliorate any issues 
that could potentially provide a compelling governmental interest. See Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 911. Justice Kennedy clearly stated that shareholder protection could not 
justify the BCRA regulations at issue in Citizens United because of the options already 
available through corporate democracy. See id. Rather than “enhance” or “enable” 
corporate democracy, the mandatory voting proposals would likely be viewed as an 
additional, and unconstitutional, burden by the Court.  
 193 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. 
 194 End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. § 2 
(2010) (“Any expenditure by a public company to influence public opinion on matters 
not related to the company’s products or services that has not been approved by a 
majority of the votes cast by shareholders to approve or disapprove such expenditure 
shall be considered a breach of a fiduciary duty of the officers and directors who 
authorized such an expenditure.”). 
 195 Corporations often run general “Happy Holidays” or other types of 
advertisements that are “not related” to their products or services. For example, Kmart 
paid for an advertisement in the New York Times shortly after September 11, 2001 that 
was simply a full-page American flag. See N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at 24. 
 196 But see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 977-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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Second, the Act would cover media corporations because 
it provides no exemption for such entities.197 The Citizens 
United Court cautioned that any bill that hinders the ability of 
a media corporation to engage in political speech will almost 
certainly fail the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis.198 This 
proposal runs afoul of that principle by defining “public 
company” in a manner that would encompass any media 
organization that is owned by a publicly traded corporation.199 
Third, the Act would likely cover some independent 
expenditures made for the purpose of lobbying.200 The Citizens 
United Court stated that although mandating disclosure of 
lobbying expenditures is constitutional, the Constitution does 
not tolerate other restrictions on lobbying.201 Many corporations 
have in-house employees, consultants, and lawyers that lobby 
federal, state, and local governments on a range of regulatory and 
appropriations-related issues. In addition, corporations often 
contribute funds to trade associations, such as the Recording 
Industry Association of America or the Pharmaceutical Research 
Manufacturers of America, in order to support lobbying efforts on 
behalf of their industry. The Court would likely find a barrier of 
mandatory shareholder approval between a corporation and 
policymakers or regulators impermissible. 
Therefore, the Act is overinclusive in that it encompasses 
media corporations and covers vastly more speech than 
independent political expenditures, including goodwill 
advertising campaigns and lobbying activities. Due to this 
overinclusiveness, the Shareholder Funds Act fails the “fit” 
analysis set forth in Citizens United and is not “narrowly 
tailored” to the shareholder-protection interest. 
  
 197 See Jones, supra note 2, at 305-08. For a discussion of the media/non-media 
corporation divide in campaign finance jurisprudence, see Joel M. Gora, The First 
Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 955-57 (2011). 
 198 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906 (“There is simply no support for the 
view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the 
suppression of political speech by media corporations.”). 
 199 See id. For example, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and all 
major American television news networks are owned by publicly traded corporations. 
The bill defines a “public company” as “any issuer that is required to submit periodical 
or other reports under section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78m).” H.R. 4487 § 3(1). 
 200 It is likely that courts would interpret the bill to cover some lobbying 
expenses since support of a tax-related bill, immigration reform, or healthcare legislation 
would presumably be “not related to the company’s products or services.” H.R. 4487 § 2. 
 201 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915. 
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2. Shareholder Protection Act 
Similar to the Shareholder Funds Act, the Shareholder 
Protection Act will likely fail the “narrowly tailored” analysis, 
because it contains two aspects that render it overinclusive.202 
First, the exemption for media corporations is extremely 
narrow.203 While the New York Times Company’s “sole 
business” is the publication of news (and so it would be 
exempted from the Act), the companies that own and operate 
ABC News or The Colbert Report, for example, would not be 
exempted, because they operate businesses that are not dedicated 
to publication of news or related purposes.204 Therefore, the 
Shareholder Protection Act would impermissibly subject many 
significant media outlets in the United States to rigorous 
shareholder-approval procedures. As noted above, the Citizens 
United Court made it clear that even the potential for regulation 
of political speech or expenditures of media corporations would 
almost certainly fail the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis.205 
Second, the Shareholder Protection Act is overinclusive 
because it would apply not only to independent expenditures in 
federal elections, but also to independent expenditures made 
with regard to state or local elections.206 This broad and explicit 
application reaches far beyond the expenditures that the BCRA 
sought to restrict and raises serious federalism concerns.207 The 
Court, under Citizens United or other Supreme Court 
precedent, would likely invalidate this provision because it 
exceeds the power granted to Congress.208 The BCRA did not 
venture to regulate corporate expenditures made with regard 
  
 202 See Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1041-45 (2011). 
 203 Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. § 3(d) (2010). 
 204 The New York Times Company is the owner of the New York Times and 
several other newspapers. ABC News is owned by The Walt Disney Company and The 
Colbert Report is aired on Comedy Central, which is owned by Viacom. The Walt 
Disney Company and Viacom both have divisions or subsidiaries that would not be 
considered publishers or broadcasters of “news, commentary, literature, music, 
entertainment, artistic expression, scientific, historical or academic works, or other 
forms of information.” Id. For example, The Walt Disney Company owns and operates 
theme parks and Viacom owns video-gaming websites. Neither of these examples 
constitutes publishing or broadcasting of any kind. 
 205 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906; see also supra Part IV.C.1. 
 206 H.R. 4537 § 3(e)(4)(A)(i). 
 207 But see Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, 
(manuscript at 66-69). 
 208 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (holding that the power to 
regulate state elections is vested in the states, not Congress, pursuant to the Elections 
Clause); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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to state or local elections, and the broad sweep of this proposal 
crosses the line between what Congress can and cannot 
regulate.209 
Therefore, the Shareholder Protection Act is 
overinclusive because it would not exempt many media 
corporations and would unprecedentedly expand federal 
campaign-finance law to regulate corporate expenditures in 
state and local elections. As a result of this overinclusiveness, 
the Shareholder Protection Act fails the “fit” analysis set forth 
in Citizens United, and the Court will likely find it not 
“narrowly tailored” to the shareholder-protection interest. 
3. Brennan Center for Justice Proposal 
The Brennan Center Proposal has the same core element 
as the Shareholder Funds Act and the Shareholder Protection 
Act—it would require “corporations [to] obtain the consent of 
shareholders before making political expenditures.”210 The 
proposal defines “political activity” as “any contributions or 
expenditures made directly or indirectly to, or in support of or 
opposition to, any candidate, political party, committee, 
electioneering communication, ballot measure campaign, or an 
issue advocacy campaign.”211 While the Brennan Center Proposal 
does exempt expenditures on lobbying from coverage, it makes no 
exception for media corporations.212 Although it is the best crafted 
of the three proposals, the Brennan Center Proposal is still likely 
to fail the “narrowly tailored” analysis because it contains 
elements that render it both over- and underinclusive. 
Two aspects of the Brennan Center Proposal are 
overinclusive. First, the proposal would apply equally to publicly 
owned nonmedia and media corporations alike.213 In Citizens 
United, the Court found that even the mere possibility of 
restricting media corporations would ensure constitutional 
  
 209 BCRA prohibited corporations from expending general treasury funds for 
“electioneering communications,” which were defined as broadcast advertisements that 
“refer to” a federal candidate for a period of time directly before a primary or general 
election. L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB98025, CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOFT MONEY 1 (2003), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/28106.pdf. It is likely that it is beyond the 
enumerated powers granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution to regulate campaign 
financing with regard to state or local elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; 
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.  
 210 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 21. 
 211 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, (manuscript at 72).  
 212 See id. 
 213 See id. at 71-77. 
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invalidation of any campaign-finance legislation.214 The proposal 
does not attempt to exempt media corporations nor does it 
address this point of overinclusiveness as a known shortcoming. 
This aspect of the proposal casts too wide a net and would 
encompass every major media corporation in a way that the 
Court likely will find impermissible under the First 
Amendment. 
Second, the Brennan Center Proposal would restrict a 
corporation’s ability to conduct an “issue advocacy campaign” 
which, as defined, is overly broad because it could potentially 
include activity from which shareholders need no protection.215 The 
proposal would define “issue advocacy campaign” as “contributions 
or expenditures for any communication to the general public 
intended to encourage the public to contact a government official 
regarding pending legislation, public policy or a government rule or 
regulation.”216 Although corporations and free speech advocates 
may raise issues based on the straightforward result of this 
definition, the potentially unintended—but nonetheless likely—
results are of greatest concern.  
For example, the Brennan Center Proposal would not 
allow the host of The Colbert Report to spend time on his show to 
discuss the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law in a way that might be 
reasonably interpreted as encouraging the viewing public to 
contact their government representatives.217 Certainly, the host of 
the show is well-compensated, and Comedy Central along with its 
corporate parent, Viacom, has spent more than $10,000 to produce 
and air the show. Therefore, in a fair reading of the proposal’s text, 
it would seem that this expenditure would need shareholder 
approval.  
Another example of this likely result could involve a 
situation where a corporate leader speaks out on behalf of (or 
in opposition to) proposed legislation. On March 27, 2009, chief 
executive officers (CEOs) of the nation’s several major banks 
met with President Obama at the White House.218 If there had 
  
 214 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010). 
 215 See Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, 
(manuscript at 72). This may also be a problem with the other two proposals, although 
their definitions are not clear enough for a proper analysis. This definitional problem 
may also raise an issue of potential constitutional vagueness. 
 216 Id. 
 217 See The Colbert Report (Comedy Central Television broadcast Dec. 7, 
2010), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/367669/ 
december-07-2010/poll-to-repeal-don-t-ask--don-t-tell. 
 218 Eamon Javers, Inside Obama’s Bank CEOs Meeting, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 
2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0409/20871.html. 
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been a press conference afterward and one or more of the CEOs 
had spoken in support of a regulation or proposed legislation, 
such speech may have constituted a violation of the proposal. 
Although news networks may broadcast the message free of 
charge, the CEO likely flew, at the company’s cost, on a very 
expensive private plane to the White House and spent corporate 
time and money preparing for the meeting and the press 
conference. As long as the CEO speaks in his or her official 
corporate role, the corporation pays him or her to deliver that 
message. Again, a literal and straightforward reading of the 
proposal yields results that go well beyond addressing 
independent expenditures and are far broader than requirements 
intended to protect the interest of the shareholders.  
In addition to the Brennan Center Proposal’s 
overinclusiveness, another aspect of the proposal is 
underinclusive. The proposal does not cover charitable 
contributions, independent charitable expenditures,219 or speech 
supporting a charitable cause, all of which share many of the 
same characteristics as independent political expenditures and 
contain a similar risk of contravening shareholder interests. Like 
independent political expenditures, charitable expenditures are 
an activity in which “managers of publicly-traded companies 
spend . . . using other people’s money—in part, money invested by 
shareholders.”220 In addition, charitable expenditures are similar 
to political expenditures, because they are unlikely directly 
related to the products or services offered by the corporation. At a 
high level, the aims of charitable and political expenditures are 
similar—they impact arenas outside of the market in which the 
corporation operates.221 If the Brennan Center Proposal covered 
political expenditures while not regulating charitable 
expenditures, then it would specifically single out political 
expenditures for disfavor. Further, it would limit the scope of this 
regulation so that it would not be broad enough and therefore 
inappropriately tailored to the shareholder-protection interest. 
  
 219 The non-inclusion of independent charitable expenditures is potentially an 
exception that could swallow the rule. Many political expenditures could be cast as 
charitable expenditures, as can be seen in the complicated relationship (and overlap) 
between 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations. 
 220 Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 9 
(citation omitted). 
 221 See Gilson & Klausner, supra note 24 (“Typically [charitable contributions] 
are uncontroversial, providing support to schools, art museums, United Way and the 
like in communities where the corporation does business. A willful chief executive can 
use corporate funds to make contributions to pet causes, but this type of behavior is 
rare and, like other self-interested dealing, constrained by ordinary board oversight.”). 
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Thus, the proposal is overinclusive because it would not 
exempt media corporations and it would inhibit corporations 
from undertaking typical public-policy advocacy. In addition, 
the proposal is underinclusive because it would not regulate 
charitable speech, contributions, or expenditures. As a result of 
this over- and underinclusiveness, the Brennan Center 
Proposal fails the “fit” analysis set forth in Citizens United, and 
the Court is unlikely to find it “narrowly tailored” to the 
shareholder-protection interest. 
D. Content-Neutrality Analysis 
The “fit” analysis under Citizens United’s conception of 
shareholder protection as a compelling governmental interest 
is the most pertinent analytical tool available to critique the 
mandatory shareholder-approval proposals. However, a 
secondary constitutional argument may be made with regard to 
the proposals; namely, they violate the content-neutrality 
principle, a fundamental tenet of the First Amendment.222 The 
seminal case Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley223 
articulated the content-neutrality principle. In Mosley, a 
protester challenged an ordinance that disallowed nonlabor 
picketing, but allowed labor-related picketing, in front of 
schools.224 The Court held the ordinance to be unconstitutional 
because it made an impermissible distinction between labor-
related picketing and other peaceful picketing.225 Further, the 
Court stated that “the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”226 
The mandatory shareholder-approval proposals violate 
Mosley’s content-neutrality principle because they restrict only 
certain speech based on content. For example, the proposals do 
nothing to inhibit charitable speech or other types of speech that 
may be unrelated to the products and services of the company. 
These proposals would not require shareholder approval for 
corporate management to spend money on contributions to 
  
 222 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the 
First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (1994). 
 223 See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Although Mosley is a 
seminal case exemplifying the Court’s treatment of the content-neutrality principle, it 
has been repeatedly enshrined by the Court as a central tenet of the First Amendment. 
See Fallon, supra note 222, at 20. 
 224 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93. 
 225 Id. at 94. 
 226 Id. at 95. 
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charitable organizations, encourage the public to donate or 
volunteer for charitable organizations, or even run advertisements 
supporting corporate management’s favorite sports teams.227 Still, 
when it comes to political speech, under these proposals, corporate 
management would be required to seek shareholder approval and 
follow very specific regulations. The Mosley Court prohibited 
“[s]elective exclusions from a public form . . . based on content 
alone,”228 such as the prohibition on running advertisements about 
political issues without shareholder approval but allowing 
advertisements about charitable or other pet causes without 
restriction of any kind. 
Although the content-neutrality analysis would vary 
slightly between the three mandatory shareholder-approval 
proposals, the main thrust of the proposals is identical. 
Because “[a]ny restriction on expressive activity because of its 
content . . . completely undercut[s] the ‘profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’”229 any 
significant restriction of a corporation’s ability to make 
independent political expenditures is impermissible under the 
content-neutrality principle of the First Amendment. Because 
Citizens United placed political speech at the core of the First 
Amendment’s protection and Mosley identified the content-
neutrality principle as fundamental, these proposals are ripe 
for invalidation by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Many legislative and regulatory responses to Citizens 
United have been proposed and the three mandatory 
shareholder proposals discussed in this note are certainly 
among the most well-intentioned and carefully constructed. 
Although they would have the potential to ameliorate the 
effects of Citizens United regarding independent political 
expenditures by corporations, they run afoul of that very 
decision’s interpretation of the First Amendment. 
Even if the Court finds shareholder protection to be a 
compelling governmental interest, none of the three proposals is 
narrowly tailored to that interest. The shareholder democracy 
  
 227 While there may be limitations on such activities from corporate law, they 
are immaterial for this note’s constitutional analysis. 
 228 Id. at 96. 
 229 Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
2011] AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE 381 
and “fit” analysis, articulated with regard to the shareholder-
protection interest in Citizens United, does not permit any of the 
three mandatory shareholder-approval proposals to exist within 
current First Amendment jurisprudence. In addition, the 
proposals likely violate the content-neutrality rule by placing 
significant burdens on corporations wishing to exercise their 
political rights while failing to place similar restrictions on other 
forms of corporate speech. 
As a result of these constitutionally doomed proposals, 
PepsiCo may uninhibitedly support a potential campaign by Mr. 
Colbert for President in 2012 and similarly, Viacom will not have 
to seek shareholder approval before airing an episode of The 
Colbert Report that features Mr. Colbert’s candidacy.230 In the new 
legal and constitutional landscape of Citizens United, corporations 
have unprecedented constitutional protection for political 
activities. Although scholars and legislators may continue to craft 
creative responses, the barriers to restricting corporate political 
speech remain stronger than ever. 
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